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 1 
Exploring the Relationship between Housing Downturns and Partisan Elections: 1 
Neighborhood-Level Evidence from Maricopa County, Arizona 2 
 3 
Abstract 4 
An understudied outcome of foreclosure crises is how their aftershocks affect partisan elections. 5 
Two hypotheses are that partisan shifts may occur in neighborhoods with concentrated 6 
foreclosures because of 1) declines in turnout among liberal leaning voters or 2) swells of anti-7 
incumbency among all voters. This research explores these hypotheses in Maricopa County, 8 
Arizona by using econometric modeling to uncover associations among neighborhood 9 
foreclosures, voter turnout, and changes in the Republican vote share between the 2006 and the 10 
2010 Arizona gubernatorial and U.S. Senate elections. Our results show evidence of 1) anti-11 
incumbent voting behavior and more liberal shifts among neighborhoods harder hit by 12 
foreclosures and 2) conservative shifts in neighborhoods experiencing African American and 13 
Latinx population growth. These findings are suggestive of a link between neighborhood housing 14 
market distress and neighborhood partisan shifts, which in aggregate may shape state and 15 
national policymaking and future neighborhood conditions. 16 
 17 
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 2 
Introduction 1 
 A diverse body of scholarship reveals how the foreclosure crisis and subsequent Great 2 
Recession affected people and neighborhoods in the U.S. Poorer neighborhoods and 3 
communities of color, particularly segregated African American and Latinx communities that 4 
experienced sudden ÒgreenliningÓ after decades of redlining, were more affected by foreclosures 5 
(e.g., Anacker, Carr, and Pradhan 2012; Lichtenstein and Weber 2014; Hernandez 2009; Rugh 6 
and Massey 2010; Wyly et al. 2009). Concentrated foreclosures had multiplier effects on 7 
neighborhood quality of life, including declining property values and local public services and 8 
increasing crime (e.g., Immergluck and Smith 2006a, b; Ellen, Lacoe, and Sharygin 2013; Katz, 9 
Wallace, and Hedberg 2013; Kingsley, Smith, and Price 2009; Kobie and Lee 2011).  10 
 Less understood is whether and how the recent downturn affected political outcomes. 11 
Research has shown that the Great Recession was fundamentally a housing issue, not simply an 12 
economic or financial crisis, and had its roots in local policy decisions about how, where, and for 13 
whom housing was built (Schafran 2013; Glasgow, Lewis, and Neiman 2012). The scholarly 14 
community has similarly few doubts as to the important role of state and national policy in the 15 
production of foreclosure (Immergluck 2011). But did voters feel similarly? Did living in a high 16 
foreclosure neighborhood impact voting in state and national elections? Or to put it broadly, is 17 
housing an overlooked factor in explaining electoral behavior?  18 
In this article, we explore the link between housing distress and electoral politics by 19 
examining the connection between foreclosures and the 2006 and the 2010 Arizona gubernatorial 20 
and U.S. Senate elections in Maricopa County, ArizonaÑa fast growing Sunbelt region hard hit 21 
by the recent recession. We use econometric methods to investigate two mechanisms that may 22 
link housing downturns to neighborhood political shiftsÑa decline in turnout among liberal 23 
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 3 
leaning voters and a rise in anti-incumbency among all voters. Although there is no clear 1 
evidence linking a decline in liberal voter turnout to foreclosures, our results show strong 2 
evidence of anti-incumbent voting behavior in neighborhoods harder hit by foreclosures. These 3 
findings suggest that there is a relationship between neighborhood housing distress and 4 
neighborhood partisan shifts, which is in line with some, but not all, of the recent literature on 5 
the relationship between the foreclosure crisis and voting patterns (Zonta, Edelman, and 6 
McArthur 2016; Raymond 2017; Healy and Lenz 2017). Our neighborhood-level approach also 7 
reveals the potential of applying the geographic sensibilities of urban studies to questions that 8 
have traditionally fallen within the purview of political science. 9 
In the following sections, we first review the limited literature that directly examines the 10 
link between foreclosures and voting patterns. We then describe potential linkages between 11 
foreclosures and partisan voting behavior, drawing on literature from a wide variety of fields, 12 
and show how we generated testable hypotheses regarding voter turnout and anti-incumbency. 13 
We then describe our case study site, hypotheses, and methodology and explore the links 14 
between neighborhood foreclosure rates, voter turnout, and the change in the Republican vote 15 
share between the 2006 and the 2010 Arizona gubernatorial and U.S. Senate elections in 16 
Maricopa County.  17 
We conclude by examining the implications of this research, including the possibility of a 18 
housing distress political feedback loop. We outline a research agenda to further explore 19 
relationships between housing and electoral politics in the U.S., including the need to focus on a 20 
potential transitive link between housing crises and electoral change, such as through 21 
neighborhood demographic shifts. 22 
 23 
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 4 
The Underexamined Link between Housing and Voting 1 
 Research on the effects of the housing crisis on partisan voting behavior has only recently 2 
begun. So far, the findings are inconclusive.  National polling data on the political attitudes of the 3 
foreclosed shows no evidence that they disproportionately express particular partisan leanings; 4 
rather, the foreclosed exhibit a mix of Òdisenfranchisement and disillusionment,Ó whereby they 5 
seem less likely to vote and believe in the possibility of electoral politics (Martin & Niedt 2015). 6 
This finding dovetails with research on the effects of foreclosure on voter turnout, which shows 7 
depressed turnout among the foreclosed and in neighborhoods hard hit by foreclosure (Hall, 8 
Yoder, and Karandikar 2017; Estrada-Correa and Johnson 2012).  9 
A few studies suggest that housing distress may influence partisan voting behavior 10 
(Raymond 2017; Zonta et al. 2016; Healy and Lenz 2017). For instance, Midwestern and 11 
Rustbelt counties with a higher percentage of underwater homes (i.e., owing more than a home is 12 
worth) were more likely to express increased voter support for the Republican presidential 13 
candidate from 2012 to 2016 (Zonta et al. 2016; Raymond 2017). California zip codes with 14 
greater increases in delinquency rates for consumer loans, including mortgages, from 2006 to 15 
2008 were more likely to express increased voter support for the Democratic presidential 16 
candidate from 2004 to 2008 (Healy and Lenz 2017). Yet, the evidence is not unanimous. U.S. 17 
counties that had higher foreclosure rates in between presidential and legislative elections during 18 
the 2000s and 2010s were no more or less likely to vote for incumbents (Hall et al. 2017). 19 
A key challenge in understanding links between housing crises and partisan voting 20 
behavior is that the above-cited research remains the exception, not the rule, in both urban 21 
studies and political science, especially when it comes to partisanship. Housing scholars in the 22 
field of urban studies generally focus more on the political economy of housing or housing 23 
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 5 
policy than on elections; when these scholars examine the ballot box, they tend to focus on 1 
housing-specific issues (e.g., Calavita 1992; Gerber and Phillips 2003; Nelson, Uwasu, and 2 
Polasky 2007; Nguyen 2007; Gay 2017).1 Mainstream political science literature is largely silent 3 
on how housing might affect voting behavior beyond its distributive component. A scan of four 4 
leading texts on polarization and partisanship yields barely a mention of housing (Lewis-Beck, 5 
Jacoby, Norpoth, and Weisberg 2011; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Nivola and Brady 6 
2008; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2008). Housing is entirely missing from the index of The 7 
Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior (Leighley 2010). Housing is 8 
incidental in half of the few recent political science studies on foreclosures and voting behavior 9 
reviewed above, as these scholarsÕ main interest is on the relationship between the economy and 10 
elections (Healy and Lenz 2017; Hall et al. 2017). 11 
Knowledge on how housing crises might affect partisan voting behavior within 12 
neighborhoods is especially scant, as most of the recent literature on foreclosures and elections 13 
focuses on counties or individuals. Foreclosures do not just befall or spare individual potential 14 
voters; they also affect the communities in which voters live (e.g., Immergluck and Smith 2006a, 15 
b; Ellen, Lacoe, and Sharygin 2013; Katz, Wallace, and Hedberg 2013; Kingsley, Smith, and 16 
Price 2009; Kobie and Lee 2011). Foreclosures are relatively rare events even in hard-hit regions 17 
in the throes of a severe recession, but it is reasonable to suppose that their influence multiplies 18 
beyond those they directly affect when they concentrate in particular neighborhoods and not 19 
others.  20 
 In the absence of clear guidance from either housing or politics scholars on the 21 
relationship between housing downturns and partisan voting behavior, we broadened our search 22 
to include the urban studies literatures on the effects of the recent recession and homeownersÕ 23 
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 6 
civic engagement and the political science literature on voting behavior. These literatures point 1 
to two possible mechanisms that may link housing downturns to partisan voting behavior, which 2 
also are mentioned in Healy and Lenz (2017) and Hall et al. (2017). The first is a link between 3 
foreclosures and declines in turnout among more liberal leaning voters. The second is a link 4 
between foreclosures and swells of anti-incumbency among all voters. These two mechanisms 5 
form the basis for our hypotheses, which we describe and consider in the subsequent sections. 6 
 7 
Declines in Turnout among Liberal Leaning Voters 8 
 One way that neighborhood foreclosures may relate to partisan shifts is by depressing 9 
voter turnout. Demographic characteristics are strongly linked with partisan preferences (Pew 10 
Research Center 2015). The relationship between race and ethnicity and partisan preference is of 11 
particular interest in this research given the extreme racial inequality in the experience of 12 
foreclosure, as previously discussed. African Americans and Latinxs, traditionally more liberal 13 
or left leaning demographic groups, experienced the foreclosure crisis more intensely than non-14 
Latinx whites, a traditionally more conservative leaning demographic group (Pew Research 15 
Center 2015; e.g., Anacker et al. 2012; Lichtenstein and Weber 2014; Wyly et al. 2009). Thus, 16 
neighborhood foreclosures may lead to conservative shifts by reducing turnout among African 17 
American and Latinx voters.  18 
 Declines in voter turnout among African Americans and Latinxs may stem from three 19 
separate outcomes from foreclosuresÑ1) declines in homeownership, 2) heightened economic 20 
adversity and 3) higher residential mobility. First, neighborhood foreclosures may usher in a 21 
conservative shift by reducing the number of more liberal leaning homeowners within the 22 
neighborhood. This shift may happen as more liberal leaning homeowners leave the 23 
Page 6 of 43
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/uar
Urban Affairs Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 7 
neighborhood after undergoing foreclosure and fewer liberal leaning homeowners move into the 1 
neighborhood. There is broad consensus that homeownership in the U.S. is associated with 2 
higher rates of voting (e.g., Zavisca and Gerber 2016; Manturuk, Lindblad, and Quercia 2009; 3 
DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; McCabe 2013; Fischel 2005). Homeowners participate in politics 4 
to a greater extent than renters because of their need to protect what is, for most of them, their 5 
most valuable financial assetÑtheir own home (Fischel 2005). Homeowners also have more of 6 
an incentive to vote to preserve and enhance their neighborhood quality of life, because they stay 7 
put for longer than renters (Cox 1982; Ihrke and Faber 2012). Thus, when neighborhoods with 8 
concentrated foreclosures experience a decrease in their proportion of more liberal leaning 9 
homeowners, their liberal voter turnout may also decrease.  10 
 Second, economic adversity in the wake of foreclosures may reduce turnout among more 11 
liberal voters and lead to a conservative shift. Economic adversity was common within 12 
neighborhoods with concentrated foreclosures. Families who underwent foreclosure typically 13 
experienced a Òperfect stormÓ of economic disasters, such as job loss, illness, and divorce 14 
(Bowdler, Quercia, and Smith, 2010; Kingsley et al. 2009; Saegert, Fields, and Libman 2009; 15 
Pfeiffer, Wong, Ong, and de la Cruz-Viesca 2017). Data from the National Suburban Survey 16 
found that homeowners experiencing foreclosure between the fall of 2007 and 2010 were more 17 
likely to experience unemployment (Niedt and Martin 2013); unemployment also was more 18 
commonly experienced by African Americans and Latinxs than non-Latinx whites during this 19 
period (U.S. Census 2010a). Homeowners who were able to short sell or hold on to their homes 20 
but were underwater (owed more on their mortgage than their home was worth) also experienced 21 
economic adversity (White 2010). Economic adversity, in turn, is associated with lower voter 22 
turnout (Rosenstone 1982). Thus, neighborhoods with more foreclosures may have more 23 
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 8 
concentrated economic adversity, lower voter turnout among liberal leaning African Americans 1 
and Latinxs, and therefore a more conservative lean in election outcomes.  2 
 Third, higher residential mobility in the wake of foreclosures also may reduce voter 3 
turnout among more liberal leaning African Americans and Latinxs and lead to a conservative 4 
shift within neighborhoods. Neighborhoods with concentrated foreclosures had higher residential 5 
mobility, particularly those where investors bought and converted former foreclosures to rentals, 6 
as renters are more likely to move (Ihrke and Faber 2012). People who have recently moved are 7 
less likely to vote (Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass 1987; Estrada-Correa and Johnson 2012; Gay 8 
2012). The logistics of registering to voteÑone among many Òto-dosÓ for people in the process 9 
of movingÑdeters recent movers from voting (Squire et al. 1987). The impact on the electorate 10 
falls disproportionately on young adults, who move at the highest rates and also are traditionally 11 
more liberal leaning (Squire et al. 1987; Pew Research Center 2015).  12 
 Further, foreclosures force involuntary moves on homeowners, which may compound a 13 
householdÕs stress and barriers to voting (Estrada-Correa and Johnson 2012; Hall et al. 2017; 14 
Martin and Niedt 2015). For example, people who experienced foreclosure were less likely to 15 
vote in Ohio in the 2000s and 2010s, with stronger effects occurring when foreclosures happened 16 
close to election day (Hall et al. 2017). Voters in California zip codes with higher foreclosure 17 
rates were less likely to participate in the 2008 presidential election (Estrada-Correa and Johnson 18 
2012), which suggests that the impacts of foreclosure on voting behavior fall not just on the 19 
relatively small number of people who experience it directly but also those who live in 20 
neighborhoods where foreclosures are spatially concentrated. It follows that neighborhoods with 21 
more foreclosures may have higher residential mobility, lower voter turnout, and a more 22 
conservative lean to election outcomes if movers are disproportionately more liberal leaning.  23 
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 9 
 Overall, this diverse body of research on the link between voter turnout and 1 
homeownership, economic adversity, and residential mobility suggests that housing downturns 2 
could lead to a net loss among more liberal leaning votes and a conservative shift within the 3 
hardest hit communities. This conservative shift, under this explanation, occurs because more 4 
liberal leaning votes are lost through African Americans and Latinxs transitioning out of 5 
homeownership and experiencing economic stress than are gained when African Americans and 6 
Latinxs move locally and become renters, because newcomers and renters and economically 7 
stressed people have low rates of voting.    8 
 9 
Rise in Anti-Incumbency among All Voters 10 
 Another way that neighborhood foreclosures may relate to partisan shifts is by sowing 11 
votersÕ discontent with political incumbents who support the status quo and fueling support for 12 
political challengers who vow to change the status quo. A recurrent theme in the political science 13 
literature is that economic shocks may influence voters to reject incumbents. Bartels (2013) 14 
cautions against a ÒromanticÓ notion of democracy, i.e., that voters rationally choose from 15 
among a set of competing policy programs and select the one that best aligns with societal 16 
interests, or at least their interests. Instead, voters punish or reward incumbents based on the 17 
performance of the economy in a pattern that largely transcends ideology. This tendency is 18 
particularly strong in a two-party system such as the U.S., where aside from (usually marginal) 19 
third party candidates or cases where seats are open, votersÕ choices are limited to supporting the 20 
status quo (the incumbent) or voting for change (the challenger) (Blendon and Benson 2010).  21 
Bartels demonstrates the link between economic growth and support for incumbency 22 
across national contexts, and in a separate analysis uses only the two factors of incumbency and 23 
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 10 
income growth to account for fully 75% of the variation in U.S. presidential election results 1 
dating back to World War II. Seen through this lens, the rightward lurch exemplified by the Tea 2 
Party wave in the 2010 electionÑa movement captured in our empirical resultsÑwas to many 3 
political scientists entirely predictable, despite the befuddlement it evoked from many media 4 
commentators (Blendon and Benson 2010).  5 
 Whether a relationship between nationwide economic growth and anti-incumbency 6 
translates to anti-incumbency in the wake of neighborhood foreclosures is unclear but at least 7 
plausible. For instance, Bisgaard, S¿nderskov, and Dinesen (2016) used disaggregated survey 8 
data to demonstrate that Danish residentsÕ perceptions of the state of the national economy are 9 
strongly related to the level of unemployment that exists within close proximity (80 meters) to 10 
their residence. A body of literature on homeownersÕ civic engagement finds that dissatisfied 11 
homeowners are more likely to vote than either satisfied homeowners or renters (Holian 2011; 12 
Manturuk et al. 2009). Homeowners are particularly more likely to vote in disadvantaged 13 
neighborhoods, as they may feel more of a need to politically engage in order to protect their 14 
investment (Manturuk et al. 2009). Concentrated foreclosures are associated with declining 15 
property values, increasing crime, and a growing incidence of underwater mortgages (e.g., Ellen, 16 
Lacoe, and Sharygin 2013; Immergluck and Smith, 2006a, 2006b; Katz, Wallace, and Hedberg 17 
2013; Kingsley et al. 2009; Kobie and Lee 2011; Joint Center for Housing Studies 2011). These 18 
conditions are a recipe for higher homeowner discontent and potential anti-incumbent support. 19 
Further, newcomers to the community (e.g., renters moving into former foreclosures converted to 20 
rentals by investors) may have aligned their voting behaviors with longtime residents in the 21 
community in order to fit in if they overcame barriers to voting after a move. This phenomenon, 22 
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 11 
which has been empirically demonstrated in the United Kingdom (MacAllister et al. 2001), could 1 
increase the effect of existing anti-incumbent sentiment in the neighborhood at the polls.   2 
 Evidence of a link between the recent housing downturn and anti-incumbency is building, 3 
especially in the literature devoted to examining the electoral impacts of foreclosure, as was 4 
previously discussed (Raymond 2017; Healy and Lenz 2017; Zonta et al. 2016). Another recent 5 
study shows that congressional districts where voters felt more positively about their lives were 6 
more likely to re-elect incumbents than districts where voters felt less positively about their lives 7 
in the 2010 U.S. House of Representatives elections (Park and Peterson 2017). These findings 8 
suggest that concentrated foreclosures may be associated with 1) conservative shifts in 9 
neighborhoods when liberals are incumbents or open seats are contested after having been 10 
vacated by a liberal officeholder or 2) liberal shifts in neighborhoods when conservatives are 11 
incumbents or open seats are contested after having been vacated by a conservative officeholder. 12 
 13 
The 2006 and 2010 Arizona Gubernatorial and U.S. Senate Elections in Maricopa County, 14 
Arizona  15 
 Maricopa County, Arizona is an ideal place to investigate whether neighborhood 16 
foreclosures are associated with neighborhood partisan shifts in state and national elections, and 17 
if so, whether declines in turnout among liberal leaning voters or anti-incumbency play a role. 18 
Maricopa County is a large, fast growing region in the U.S. Sunbelt, defined by its largely 19 
automobile-dependent and suburban form. Untrammeled growth in single-family detached 20 
homes and increases in homeownership during the early to mid 2000s, sometimes on the backs 21 
of risky and subprime loans, contributed to the region becoming one of the epicenters of the 22 
foreclosure crisis (Ross 2011; Schafran 2013; Glasgow et al. 2012). Maricopa CountyÕs single 23 
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 12 
family detached housing stock grew about 30% from 2000 to 2006, with some of the most rapid 1 
growth occurring in its outlying Òboomburbs,Ó including Chandler, Gilbert, Glendale, Mesa, and 2 
Peoria (U.S. Census 2000, 2006; Lang and LeFurgy 2007). The countyÕs homeownership rate 3 
increased from 67% to 68% during this period (U.S. Census 2000, 2006). However, increases in 4 
homeownership were short-lived, as foreclosures flooded Maricopa CountyÕs real estate market 5 
during the late 2000s and the early 2010s. Foreclosures increased dramatically between 2007 and 6 
2008 and peaked in 2009 and 2010, when banks were foreclosing on about 50,000 homes a year. 7 
Foreclosures decelerated rapidly between 2011 and 2012. Overall, about 220,000 homes were 8 
foreclosed on in the county from 2004 through mid-2014 (Information Market 2014). The 9 
countyÕs homeownership rate plummeted from 68% to 64% from 2006 to 2010 alone (U.S. 10 
Census 2000, 2006, 2010b). 11 
 Maricopa County is also a microcosm of the political polarization of the U.S. The county 12 
is home to most of the population of Arizona, the state with the nationÕs greatest Òracial 13 
generation gap,Ó or demographic gulf between a hyperdiverse, liberal leaning young population 14 
and an overwhelmingly white, conservative leaning elderly population (Pastor, Scoggins, and 15 
Treuhaft 2017). About 41% of Maricopa County residents identified as people of color in 2010, a 16 
one-percentage point increase from 2006 (U.S. Census 2006, 2010b). Maricopa CountyÕs non-17 
Latinx white population dropped from 60% to 59% from 2006 to 2010 (U.S. Census 2006, 18 
2010b). The proportion of Maricopa County voters registered Republican (conservative) was 19 
43% and 38% during the 2006 and 2010 general elections respectively. The proportion of voters 20 
registered Democrat (liberal) was 30% and 29% respectively, with the balance registered under 21 
third parties or as independents (Arizona Secretary of State 2017). 22 
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 13 
 We focus on the 2006 and 2010 Arizona gubernatorial and U.S. Senate elections in this 1 
research. The 2010 gubernatorial election is of particular interest as it was one of many across 2 
the country that cemented the power of the emergent Tea Party, an insurgent political movement 3 
that largely unfolded within the long-established Republican Party and sought to upend its 4 
priorities. Tea Party politicians value freedom from government regulation and reject social 5 
welfare programs and policies that might expand the reach of government, like universal health 6 
care. In January 2009, Jan Brewer, a Tea Party Republican who was serving as Arizona 7 
Secretary of State at the time, succeeded Democratic Governor Janet Napolitano (who handily 8 
beat her Republican opponent Len Munsil in 2006), after President Obama appointed Napolitano 9 
as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. In April 2010, Brewer infamously signed 10 
into law SB 1070, which allowed law enforcement to ask for the papers of detainees suspected of 11 
being in the country illegally. In November 2010, Brewer beat a formidable Democratic 12 
candidate with deep political roots, Terry Goddard, who was the Arizona Attorney General, to 13 
earn the right to serve a full-term as governor.  14 
 The 2006 and 2010 Senate elections were less dramatic. These elections resulted in 15 
victories by a comfortable margin for two Republican incumbents over their Democratic 16 
challengers. In 2006, incumbent Republican Jon Kyl beat Democrat Jim Pederson, a real estate 17 
developer. In 2010, incumbent Republican John McCain beat Democrat Rodney Glassman, a 18 
Tucson City Councilman.  19 
 Overall, these races present an excellent opportunity to explore whether anti-incumbency 20 
is a mechanism linking housing distress to partisan shifts. Conservatives were incumbents in 21 
both of the studied races in 2010, which was in the wake of the worst foreclosure crisis in the 22 
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U.S. since the 1930s. A liberal shift in voting might signal a rise in anti-incumbency in 1 
neighborhoods harder hit by foreclosures.   2 
 3 
Hypotheses 4 
 Three hypotheses on the links among neighborhood foreclosure rates, voter turnout, and 5 
partisan shifts emerged from our review of the urban studies and political science literatures. 6 
These hypotheses form the basis for our analysis of the 2006 and 2010 Arizona gubernatorial and 7 
U.S. Senate elections in Maricopa County. Hypotheses 1 and 2 relate to the theory that declines 8 
in turnout among liberal leaning voters in the wake of foreclosures are associated with a 9 
conservative electoral shift. Hypothesis 3 relates to the theory that foreclosures are associated 10 
with a decline in electoral support for incumbents.  11 
 12 
Hypothesis 1: Neighborhood foreclosures are correlated with a decline in voter turnout, 13 
particularly among more liberal leaning African Americans and Latinxs, who were more 14 
affected by foreclosure.  15 
 16 
Hypothesis 2: Declines in neighborhood turnout among liberal leaning voters, such as 17 
African Americans and Latinxs, are correlated with a conservative electoral shift.  18 
 19 
Hypothesis 3: Neighborhood foreclosures are correlated with declines in electoral support 20 
for incumbents, which is signaled by a liberal shift in Maricopa County.  21 
 22 
 23 
Page 14 of 43
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/uar
Urban Affairs Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 15 
Data & Methods 1 
 This research uses a unique data set on foreclosures, voting outcomes, and neighborhood 2 
conditions to explore the relationships among neighborhood foreclosures, voter turnout, and 3 
partisan shifts in the Maricopa County 2006 and 2010 Arizona gubernatorial and U.S. Senate 4 
races. We use descriptive statistics and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to investigate 5 
whether declines in turnout among more liberal voters or a rise in anti-incumbency among all 6 
voters were associated with partisan shifts in neighborhoods harder hit by foreclosure.    7 
 Three sources of data inform this research. The first is property-level data on deeds of 8 
trust or real estate transactions in Maricopa County for the 22 months preceding the 2010 general 9 
electionÑJanuary 2009 through October 2010 (Information Market 2014). Data was obtained 10 
from Information Market, a company respected by the local real estate industry that aggregates 11 
publicly available information from the Maricopa County Recorder. This source tells us when 12 
and where foreclosures occurred. A property was counted as undergoing foreclosure if one of the 13 
following transactions was filed with the county: trusteeÕs deed (the most common), deed in lieu 14 
of foreclosure, sheriffÕs deed, treasurerÕs deed, or completion of forfeiture. About 102,000 homes 15 
in Maricopa County underwent foreclosure during the studied period. Property addresses of 16 
homes that underwent foreclosure were geocoded to 2010 census tracts, the definition of 17 
neighborhoods used in this research. We then divided the number of foreclosures by the number 18 
of homes within each neighborhood (see description of the U.S. Census data source below) and 19 
multiplied by 1,000 to arrive at our primary independent or explanatory variable, the foreclosure 20 
rate per 1,000 homes for the January 2009 through October 2010 period.  21 
 The second data source is precinct-level voting returns for the November 2006 and 22 
November 2010 Maricopa County general elections, obtained from the Maricopa County 23 
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 16 
Recorder (Maricopa County Recorder 2006, 2010). The voting data contain information on the 1 
candidates, their political affiliations, number of votes cast per candidate, and voter registration. 2 
There were 1,142 precincts in Maricopa County during the 2006 and 2010 general elections. 3 
There was an average of 1,397 registered voters per precinct in 2006 and 1,623 registered voters 4 
per precinct in 2010.  5 
 Some precinct boundaries changed from 2006 to 2010. We used Geographic Information 6 
Systems (GIS) to calculate the percent of area for 2006 precincts found within the boundaries of 7 
the 2010 precincts. We then multiplied this percentage by the 2006 voting outcomes to more 8 
accurately represent changes in voting outcomes over time. A downside to our approach is that it 9 
assumes that a precinctÕs 2006 voting outcomes were evenly distributed across its area, when in 10 
fact there may have been clusters of particular kinds of voting behavior within the precinct. 11 
However, the percent of area approach is a standard way to deal with problems of geographic 12 
boundary changes over time.  13 
 We then linked precinct boundaries to 2010 census tract boundaries using a crosswalk 14 
developed by the Missouri Census Data Center (MCDC) (Missouri Census Data Center 2017). 15 
We used the 2010 population as a weight for determining the proportion of the precinct 16 
contained within each tract. MCDC relies on the U.S. CensusÕs voting tabulation district (VTD) 17 
category in linking precincts to tracts. VTDs should match exactly with county precincts; 18 
however, administrative errors happen when counties transmit information on their precincts to 19 
the Census Bureau. The Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission found that 32% of 20 
Maricopa CountyÕs precincts had issues with incorrect labeling or area (Arizona Independent 21 
Redistricting Commission 2011a). The Commission developed a key matching VTDs to 22 
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precincts, which we used to correct errors in our analysis (Arizona Independent Redistricting 1 
Commission 2011b). 2 
 We created two variables from the finalized voting returns dataset. The first variable 3 
measures the change in the Republican vote share in a given neighborhood for the Arizona 4 
gubernatorial and U.S. Senate races from 2006 to 2010Ñour main dependent or outcome 5 
variable. This variable was calculated by dividing the number of votes cast for the Republican in 6 
the race in the neighborhood by the number of votes cast for either the Republican or Democratic 7 
candidate in the race in the neighborhood. This value represents the Republican candidateÕs share 8 
of the vote relative to the Democratic candidate for each race in the neighborhood, a value that in 9 
principle could range from zero to 100%. We disregarded votes cast for third party candidates. 10 
Next, we subtracted the Republican candidateÕs vote share in 2006 from their vote share in 2010 11 
to determine the change in the Republican vote share in the neighborhood from 2006 to 2010. 12 
The formula is: 13 
Y∀ =
R%&∀
R%&∀ + D%&∀
−
R&∗∀
R&∗∀ + D&∗∀
 14 
where Y is the change in the Republican vote share in neighborhood n, R10 is the votes cast for 15 
the Republican candidate in 2010, D10 is the votes cast for the Democratic candidate in 2010, R06 16 
is the votes cast for the Republican candidate in 2006, and D06 is the votes cast for the 17 
Democratic candidate in 2006.  18 
The second variable created from the voting returns dataset was the change in voter 19 
turnout from 2006 to 2010, an independent variable that may intervene in the relationship 20 
between neighborhood foreclosures and voting outcomes. We first calculated the voter turnout 21 
for each race within the neighborhood by dividing the total number of votes cast for the race, 22 
including for third party or write-in candidates, by the number of registered voters, whether 23 
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registered as Republicans, Democrats, or neither. We then subtracted the voter turnout for the 1 
race in 2006 from the voter turnout for the race in 2010 to arrive at the change in voter turnout 2 
from 2006 to 2010. 3 
 The final data sources used in this research are the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Census and the 4 
2008 to 2012 American Community Survey five-year estimates (U.S. Census, 2012, 2010b, 5 
2000). We used linear interpolation to arrive at 2006 values for variables derived from this data. 6 
We created our final independent variable, the change in the percent African American or Latinx 7 
in the neighborhood from 2006 to 2010 (expressed in terms of percentage points), from this data 8 
set. We also included a handful of control variables associated with voting behavior, including 9 
the neighborhoodÕs percent of seniors (ages 65 and older), non-Latinx whites, adults age 25 and 10 
older with at least a bachelorÕs degree, homeowners, vacant homes, and families in poverty. 11 
There are two limitations to this data. First, linear interpolation is an imperfect way of estimating 12 
conditions in the middle of two points in time, as it assumes a smooth progression from the 13 
earlier to later period, which may not reflect reality. Second, readers should keep in mind that 14 
our measure of the percent of vacant homes includes seasonal vacancies, which are common in 15 
Maricopa CountyÕs many ÒsnowbirdÓ communities where people from colder U.S. states and 16 
Canada (mainly non-Latinx whites) come to spend the winter. Margins of error for the 17 
neighborhood-level estimates for seasonal vacancies from the American Community Survey 18 
were too large to warrant inclusion in our analysis.  19 
After joining the three data sets together, we explored our three hypotheses through 1) 20 
descriptive statistics, such as means and bivariate correlations, and 2) ordinary least squares 21 
(OLS) regression modeling. The basic OLS model is specified as follows: 22 
Yn = β0 + β1nX1n+ β2nX2n+en 23 
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where Y is the dependent variable in neighborhood n, β0 is the intercept, β1n is the effect of the 1 
explanatory variable, X2n is a matrix of the control variables with effects captured in a β2n vector, 2 
and en is the error term. OLS regression was an appropriate specification for our analysis, given 3 
the relatively normal distribution of the main dependent variable, the change in the Republican 4 
vote share, and the relatively consistent linear relationships between this variable and our 5 
continuous explanatory and control variables. Diagnostics performed after running the models 6 
revealed no overt issues with omitted variables or outliers and a relatively strong model fit.  7 
Results appear in 12 models. The first eight models show whether declines in turnout 8 
among more liberal leaning voters, particularly African Americans and Latinxs, in the wake of 9 
foreclosures were associated with a conservative electoral shift. First, we assess 1) whether 10 
foreclosures were associated with declines in voter turnout and 2) whether these declines were 11 
correlated with declines in the African American or Latinx population (Hypothesis 1). Then, we 12 
examine whether declines in voter turnout and African Americans or Latinxs were associated 13 
with an increase in the Republican vote share (Hypothesis 2). The next two models show 14 
whether foreclosures were associated with declines in electoral support for incumbents, which is 15 
signaled by a decrease in the Republican vote share (Hypothesis 3). The final two models 16 
consider the relative importance of the two theories by examining their independent contribution 17 
to the change in the Republican vote share, controlling for variables associated with the other 18 
theory. 19 
It is important to note that we only indirectly investigate Hypotheses 1and 2, as the 20 
change in neighborhood voter turnout and change in percent African American or Latinx 21 
variables do not directly measure changes in neighborhood African American or Latinx voter 22 
registration or turnout. However, indirectly examining whether a decline in turnout among more 23 
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liberal leaning voters, like African Americans and Latinxs, is associated with a conservative shift 1 
using these variables is appropriate given that 1) our study is one of the first to explore this 2 
theory, 2) these variables should be associated if this theory holds truth, and 3) data on voter 3 
registration and turnout by race and ethnicity for Maricopa County are not publicly accessible. 4 
Investigating Hypotheses 1 and 2 through measures that more directly capture changes in voter 5 
registration and turnout by race and ethnicity, such as probabilistically linking surnames 6 
appearing on registered voter lists to race and ethnicity categories, or a survey of registered 7 
voters, is an important direction for further research.  8 
 Three additional notes are in order. First, our final models include a control variable for 9 
place type: location in the central city (City of Phoenix), a newer suburb (majority of housing 10 
built 1970 or later), or an older suburb (the residual) to account for geographic variation in 11 
voting outcomes and foreclosures. We discovered the importance of this variable in examining 12 
the fit of our initial models; place type was an originally omitted variable that subsequently 13 
helped to improve model fit. We also discovered a non-linear relationship between a 14 
neighborhoodÕs percent of non-Latinx whites and voting outcomes, which we accounted for by 15 
transforming that variable into a quadratic. Finally, we initially considered controlling for the 16 
effect of governmental efforts to counteract the contagion effect of foreclosures in the hardest-hit 17 
neighborhoods. However, in light of evidence from a program evaluation of the most ambitious 18 
effort, the federal governmentÕs Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) II, which sought to 19 
improve upon its predecessor NSP I, we decided not to. The analysis of 6,300 properties in 19 20 
counties yielded no consistent evidence of positive effects of NSP II expenditures on home 21 
values or sale prices (Spader et al. 2015).    22 
 23 
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  1 
The Relationship between the Foreclosure Crisis and Neighborhood Partisan Shifts in 2 
Maricopa County 3 
 This section explores the association between foreclosures and neighborhood partisan 4 
shifts in Maricopa CountyÕs Arizona gubernatorial and U.S. Senate elections. We first describe 5 
our dependent and explanatory variables and examine their correlations. We then consider 6 
support for our hypotheses on the association between neighborhood foreclosures and partisan 7 
shifts through econometric modeling.  8 
 9 
Descriptive Relationships  10 
 The Republican vote share in Maricopa County far exceeded the Democratic vote share 11 
in all of the races except for the 2006 Arizona gubernatorial race. Incumbent Republican Senator 12 
John Kyl defeated Democrat challenger Jim Pederson 57 percent to 43 percent in 2006. 13 
Incumbent Republican Senator John McCain defeated Democrat challenger Rodney Glassman 14 
by a whopping 65 percent to 35 percent in 2010. Recently appointed Republican Governor Jan 15 
Brewer defeated Democratic challenger Terry Goddard 57 percent to 43 percent in 2010. 16 
However, Republican Len Musil lost to Democrat Janet Napolitano 38 percent to 62 percent in 17 
2006. 18 
 Table 1 shows average neighborhood Republican vote shares for the Arizona 19 
gubernatorial and U.S. Senate races in 2006 and 2010.  The typical neighborhood leaned strongly 20 
conservative for the 2010 U.S. Senate Race, somewhat conservative for the 2006 U.S. Senate 21 
and 2010 Arizona gubernatorial races, and strongly liberal for the 2006 Arizona gubernatorial 22 
race, which follows the countywide results. The typical neighborhood experienced a large 23 
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 22 
increase in the Republican vote share for the Arizona gubernatorial race from 2006 to 2010 (16 1 
percentage points) and a moderate increase for the U.S. Senate race from 2006 to 2010 (seven 2 
percentage points). 3 
 Voter turnout declined in Maricopa County from 2006 to 2010. Fifty-seven and 56 4 
percent of neighborhood voters typically participated in the 2006 Arizona gubernatorial and U.S. 5 
Senate elections respectively; only about 50 percent of voters participated in the 2010 Arizona 6 
gubernatorial and U.S. Senate elections, which amounts to about a six-percentage point decline 7 
in voter turnout during this period (see Table 1).  8 
 Maricopa County foreclosure rates per 1,000 homes from January 2009 to October 2010 9 
exhibited two distinct geographic patterns. First, foreclosures were widespread; most 10 
communities in the county were affected at least to some extent. The typical neighborhood had 11 
67 homes per 1,000 undergo foreclosure during this period. Second, foreclosures were more 12 
heavily concentrated in particular communities. Higher foreclosure rates were found in west 13 
Phoenix, which is lower income and more heavily Latinx, and north Phoenix, which is higher 14 
income and more heavily white.  15 
 Maricopa County, like many urbanized counties in the U.S., is slowly becoming majority 16 
minority. The typical neighborhood had a combined African American and Latinx population of 17 
31 percent in 2006 and 34 percent in 2010. The typical neighborhood experienced a two-18 
percentage point increase in the African American and Latinx population between 2006 and 19 
2010.  20 
[Table 1 about here] 21 
 We next examined the bivariate correlations among our outcome variables, the change in 22 
the Republican vote share for the Arizona gubernatorial and U.S. Senate elections, and 23 
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explanatory variablesÑneighborhood foreclosure rate, change in voter turnout, and change in the 1 
percent African American or Latinx (see Table 2). These preliminary findings support our 2 
hypothesis that foreclosures are associated with anti-incumbent behavior, or a liberal electoral 3 
shift (Hypothesis 3). The neighborhood foreclosure rate was moderately negatively correlated 4 
with the change in the Republican vote share in the Arizona gubernatorial and U.S. Senate 5 
elections (-0.35 and -0.37 respectively), meaning that neighborhoods with higher foreclosure 6 
rates tended to have more liberal shifts over time.  7 
The findings offer partial support for our hypotheses that declines in turnout among more 8 
liberal leaning voters, such as African Americans or Latinxs, are associated with conservative 9 
electoral shifts (Hypothesis 1 and 2). The change in voter turnout and the African American and 10 
Latinx population had weaker, though still statistically significant, negative correlations with the 11 
change in the Republican vote share in the A izona gubernatorial and U.S. Senate elections (from 12 
-0.20 to -0.22 and -0.14 to -0.16 respectively). Alternatively stated, neighborhoods with greater 13 
decreases in voter turnout or African Americans or Latinxs had more conservative shifts over 14 
time. These findings align with Hypothesis 2. However, the neighborhood foreclosure rate was 15 
not statistically associated with the change in voter turnout or percent African American or 16 
Latinx, which does not align with Hypothesis 1.  17 
[Table 2 about here] 18 
 19 
Modeling Results 20 
 Table 3 explores the associations among the neighborhood foreclosure rate, the change in 21 
voter turnout, the percent African American or Latinx, and the Republican vote share, controlling 22 
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for related neighborhood characteristics. Estimates of the effects of the controls are omitted for 1 
the sake of brevity but available upon request.  2 
 Our results strongly support Hypothesis 3, which predicts that neighborhood foreclosures 3 
may be associated with partisan shifts by sowing votersÕ discontent with political incumbents 4 
who support the status quo and fueling support for political challengers who vow to change the 5 
status quo. Republicans were incumbents in both the 2010 Arizona gubernatorial and U.S. Senate 6 
elections. Thus, a negative association between the neighborhood foreclosure rate and the change 7 
in the Republican vote share would signal a liberal shift in these places and support the 8 
hypothesis that foreclosures are correlated with anti-incumbent sentiment. We see evidence of 9 
this pattern in our results (see the ÒAnti-Incumbency (Hypothesis 3)" models). The neighborhood 10 
foreclosure rate was negatively associated with the change in the Republican vote share in both 11 
races. An increase of one standard deviation in the neighborhood foreclosure rate (+52 12 
foreclosures per 1,000 homes) was associated with about a one-percentage point decline in the 13 
Republican vote share from 2006 to 2010. This association held even after controlling for the 14 
other explanatory variables (see the ÒCombinedÓ model).  15 
 We find mixed support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, which predict that neighborhood 16 
foreclosures may be associated with conservative shifts by depressing turnout among more 17 
liberal leaning voters, such as African Americans or Latinxs. Neighborhoods that had higher 18 
foreclosure rates had slightly lower voter turnouts, after controlling for their African American or 19 
Latinx population change, which aligns with Hypothesis 1 (see ÒDecline in Liberal Voters 20 
(Hypothesis 1)Ó models). An increase of one standard deviation in the neighborhood foreclosure 21 
rate was associated with a close to one percentage percent decline in voter turnout from 2006 to 22 
2010, though this effect was stronger for the Arizona gubernatorial race than the U.S. Senate 23 
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race. However, neighborhoods that experienced greater declines in their percent African 1 
American or Latinx had higher voter turnout, which does not align with Hypothesis 1. Stated 2 
differently, neighborhoods that experienced greater increases in their percent African American 3 
or Latinx had lower voter turnout. An increase of one standard deviation in the change in the 4 
percent African American or Latinx (+3 percentage points) was associated with about a one-5 
percentage point decline in voter turnout from 2006 to 2010.  6 
Further, our results do not support Hypothesis 2, that declines in turnout among liberal 7 
leaning voters, such as African Americans and Latinxs, are associated with a conservative 8 
electoral shift (see ÒDecline in Liberal Voters (Hypothesis 2)Ó models). Neighborhoods that had 9 
greater declines in voter turnout had more of a liberal electoral shift in the U.S. Senate race. 10 
Neighborhoods that had greater declines in their percent African American or Latinx had more of 11 
a liberal electoral shift in both races, though this correlation was stronger in the Arizona 12 
gubernatorial race. Stated differently, neighborhoods that experienced greater increases in their 13 
percent African American or Latinx had more of a conservative electoral shift in the Arizona 14 
gubernatorial race. A one standard deviation increase in the percent African American or Latinx 15 
was associated with a one-percentage point increase in the Republican vote share from 2006 to 16 
2010. This effect held after all explanatory variables were controlled (see ÒCombinedÓ model).  17 
 Overall, the results suggest that two partisan shifts might have occurred during the 18 
foreclosure crisis in Maricopa County: 1) an anti-incumbent shift in neighborhoods hard hit by 19 
foreclosure and 2) a conservative shift in neighborhoods with growing African American and 20 
Latinx populations.  21 
[Table 3 about here] 22 
 23 
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Conclusion: Partisan Shifts, Electoral Results and a Housing Distress Political Feedback 1 
Loop? 2 
Our research provides evidence of a link between neighborhood housing distress and 3 
neighborhood partisan shifts. Neighborhoods harder hit by foreclosures between the 2006 and 4 
2010 Arizona gubernatorial and U.S. Senate elections in Maricopa County, Arizona were more 5 
likely to exhibit anti-incumbent behavior and a liberal shift in voting, after controlling for a range 6 
of associated factors. This finding adds nuance to existing debates within 1) political science on 7 
the drivers of anti-incumbency and 2) urban studies on the outcomes of the recent foreclosure 8 
crisis and homeownersÕ civic engagement. We show that votersÕ experiences in highly leveraged 9 
owner-occupied neighborhoods during recessions may be correlated with partisan shifts at the 10 
polls, which helps to build understanding of the complex social and environmental factors that 11 
contribute to anti-incumbency in state and national elections.  12 
The lack of evidence for changes in the overall electoral outcomes in Maricopa County 13 
does not diminish the significance of the voting shifts we were able to document.2 When 14 
combined with recent work from political scientists and housing scholars (Healy and Lenz 2017; 15 
Raymond 2017; Zonta et al. 2016), our findings suggest that housing and housing-related 16 
economic issues may be overlooked factors in explaining voting behavior. Neighborhood 17 
conditions, like concentrated foreclosures, may relate to state and national election voting 18 
patterns.  19 
Far more research is needed on the link between housing and urban development and 20 
electoral politics. If housing distress affects voting and, in some cases, elections, do voting 21 
changes ultimately influence state and local housing and development policy? Does a housing 22 
distress political feedback loop dynamically link a neighborhoodÕs current housing distress to its 23 
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future housing distress through state and national partisan shifts (see Figure 1)? Evidence 1 
addressing this question is even thinner than evidence addressing the question of whether 2 
foreclosures affect voting behavior. More research is needed to determine if and how partisan 3 
shifts ultimately impact state and national housing policy and local planning, which may prolong 4 
or shorten the effects of neighborhood housing crises or shape neighborhoodsÕ vulnerability to 5 
future housing crises.  6 
[Figure 1 about here] 7 
The line of inquiry that we have pursued in this article is in its infancy. Yet, one 8 
implication of cases where anti-incumbent voting behavior fails to sway state and national 9 
elections, as occurred in Maricopa County, or fails to occur, as observed by Hall et al. (2017), is 10 
a systematic lack of attention paid by incumbents to the concerns of voters living in 11 
neighborhoods hard hit by foreclosure, given their apparent lack of incentive to do so in order to 12 
get reelected. Effective solutions to the challenges faced by neighborhoods hard hit by 13 
foreclosure have largely failed to bubble up via the electoral process (Martin and Niedt 2015). 14 
Advocates for people confronting quality-of-life degradation in such areas may have to focus 15 
their attention elsewhereÑon nonpartisan local politics or civil society rather than on partisan-16 
driven state or national politics. 17 
Our research also shows evidence of a partisan shift other than anti-incumbency that 18 
might have occurred in Maricopa County during the foreclosure crisis: a conservative shift in 19 
neighborhoods experiencing African American or Latinx population growth. This conservative 20 
shift may have had a larger effect on election outcomes than housing distress-related anti-21 
incumbency, given the large countywide margin of victory experienced by the 2010 Republican 22 
Arizona gubernatorial and U.S. Senate candidates (close to 13 and 31 points over their 23 
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Democratic challengers respectively). The political science literature provides some evidence 1 
that growing racial and ethnic diversity may lead to electoral moves to the right. Hopkins (2012) 2 
found that the migration of people of color to Baton Rouge and Houston following Hurricane 3 
Katrina was linked to a rightward shift in attitudes among white residents of the receiving 4 
communities. Other research in political science also shows a relationship among race, 5 
demographic change, and a shift to more conservative attitudes (Hopkins 2010; Craig and 6 
Richeson 2014; Zingher 2018; Newman, Shah, and Collingwood 2018).3  7 
Growing racial and ethnic diversity in the Maricopa County neighborhoods trending to 8 
the right during the late 2000s may or may not be related to foreclosures. Possible explanations 9 
include: 1) African American and Latinx homeowners fleeing impacted neighborhoods, 2) new 10 
African American and Latinx renters seeking out single-family rental conversions, or African 11 
Americans and LatinxsÕ higher birth rates or migration to the Phoenix region (Pfeiffer and Lucio 12 
2015; Rex 2011). Exploring potential multiplier effects of housing distress on neighborhood 13 
voting behavior, including a shift to the right in neighborhoods experiencing growing racial and 14 
ethnic diversity during a foreclosure crisis, is an important task for future scholarship in this area. 15 
Research in the U.S. has all too often maintained separate scholarly realms between those 16 
that study electoral politics and voting behavior and those that study housing. This article pushes 17 
forward research into this poorly understood link. In a country where both partisanship and 18 
housing crises seem to be deepening, further conversation between the political science and 19 
urban studies fields is paramount.  20 
 21 
 22 
 23 
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 1 
Notes 2 
1. There is a well-developed literature on non-partisan ballot measures related to housing 3 
production, which centers on the role of interest groups and the broader politics of development 4 
(e.g., Calavita 1992; Gerber and Phillips 2003; Nelson, Uwasu, and Polasky 2007; Nguyen 5 
2007). For instance, Nelson, Uwasu, and Polasky (2007) found that more affluent and educated 6 
communities are more likely to vote on (and for) open space preservation measures. Another 7 
example is emerging research on the link between partisan control of state governments and 8 
various aspects of housing and urban development (e.g., Gay 2017). This literature is 9 
fundamentally based in the analysis of Òdistributive politicsÓ (Kramon and Posner 2013), 10 
lumping housing together with other forms of public spending and welfare benefits, activities 11 
long acknowledged to be at the center of partisan divides. For instance, recent work by Gay 12 
(2017) suggests that Democratic governors may consider partisan loyalty in decisions about 13 
where to allocate low-income housing development subsidies.  14 
2. The rising tide of the Tea Party movement and McCainÕs high visibility as a presidential 15 
candidate in 2008 (and beloved status in Arizona, because of his longtime service to the state) 16 
may have inflated the conservative margins. Neighborhood partisan shifts might be more 17 
strongly linked to anti-incumbent election outcomes in state and national races with less rooted 18 
or temporarily elevated candidates. Gerrymandering, racial segregation, neighborhood sorting, 19 
and voting discrimination may still degrade this link in some places. Gerrymandering and racial 20 
segregation may limit the effect of neighborhood partisan shifts on election outcomes by 21 
consolidating voters with particular partisan leanings, especially in national congressional 22 
election outcomes. The sorting of people into neighborhoods based on their political leanings 23 
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may also affect partisan concentrations among neighborhoods and limit the effect of 1 
neighborhood partisan shifts on state and national election outcomes (Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2 
2013). Finally, voter suppression laws that restrict minority voting may muffle the magnitude of 3 
neighborhood anti-incumbent voting behavior where the incumbent is a Republican or where an 4 
open seat was vacated by a Republican. 5 
3. Most of this literature examines attitudes, not voting patterns, which is part of a larger trend in 6 
the scholarship of ignoring possible links among neighborhood change, housing, and partisan 7 
voting. An exception is Newman, Shah, and Collingwood (2018), who found a link between 8 
Latinx demographic growth and voting for Trump, but only after the latter ratcheted up the anti-9 
Latinx discourse. The demographic change alone did not explain the effect. 10 
 11 
  12 
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